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Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 38, Folder 31, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
Speech of Senator Mi!<:e Mansfield (D., Montana) 
For Release A.M.s Friday, July 13, 1956 
REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY - VIII 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST 
Mr. President: 
c 
This is the eighth in a series of statements on the international 
situation and foreign policy which I have been presenting since the beginning of 
the session. The nature of these discussions should now be clear to the Senate. 
I shall proceed, therefore, directly to the subject which I propose to consider 
today. My remarks will concer n the situation in the Far East, 
In recent months , there has been little discussion of American policy 
with respect to that region. Occasionally press reports remind us that a repre-
sentative o f the President has b e en carrying on conversations with the Chinese 
Co mmunists in Geneva during the past year and that these conversations continue. 
They remind us, too, that the guns still fire sporadically in the Formosa Straits 
and that Co mmunist forces still confront us across the 38th Parallel in Korea . 
What these reports tell us, in short, is that there is neither peace 
nor war in the Far East. There is only a precarious balance between the two . 
It is not a static balance, It is a balance that shifts towards one or the other, 
towards peace or war with the constant flow of developments in the \"estern 
Paciflc. 
If we were mere spectators, we could afford to turn our attention 
from this situation as we have been doing these past few months. We could 




afford to wile away our time in a discursive debate on the definition of neutralism, 
attempting to draw a precise distinction between nice neutralism and not-so-nice 
neutralism . We are not, however, mere spectators. For better or worse we 
are deeply involved in the Far East. What our policies do or do not do profoundly 
affects the shifting balance, towards peace or war, in that region. 
That is why, Mr. President, I turn to the Far East in my remarks 
today. It seems to me of the utmost importance that the Senate explore the 
question of where we stand in that region and where we are headed . In raising 
this matter, I am fully aware of the difficulties which are involved. The prob-
lems that beset us in the Far East are complex and dangerous in the extr eme. 
In dealing with them, moreover, we carry an added weight . We bear the scars 
cf is sues which a few years ago drove damaging wedges of division deep into the 
political life of this country. 
The difficulties in the Far East, however, will not become less com-
plex, less dangerous, if we pretend they do not exist . Nor will they wait for 
solution on the healing of political scars of the past. 
How long, we may well ask ourselves., will the inexorable flow of 
developments in the #estern Pacific permit us an escape of evasion? In my 
opinion, Mr. President, not for very long, perhaps not even until after the 
election . That is why I believe it is in the vital interests of this country to begin 
now to face the facts in the Far East, to face them honestly and to face them 
without partisanship. The future of this country beyond the present generation 
may well depend on our willingness and capacity to do so. 
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These facts, on the whole, are vastly different from those which 
characterized the Far East ten years ago, five years, or even a year ago. They 
are, moreover, facts whose implications in many instances are not yet entirely 
clear. Nevertheless, we must make a start, We must begin to break through 
the mist of obscurity which has settled over the situation in the Far East. Only 
as we succeed in doing so can we even hope to develop our policies in a manner 
which will be unders toad by the people of the United States -- in a manner which 
will serve their interests. 
The overriding fact in the Far East is that of Communist China, the 
colossus of over 500 million people ruled by the totalitarian dictatorship in Peking . 
We cannot close our eyes to it, It is there, Mr. President. Communist China 
may be an authoritarian reality but it is, nevertheless, a reality . 
'l'e do not have a clear picture of what goes on inside that vast and 
enigmatic core of Asian communism. If the Executive Branch has such a picture 
it has ne t been made public, I suspect that, in fact, neither this government nor 
that of any other Weste rn nation possesses a detailed grasp of the actual situation 
on the Chinese mainland, 
What we have are scattered fragments of information. Returning 
travellers note that the flies have been banished from Peking, or the sparrows 
from Canton. ~ve hear of the harrowing experiences of refugees and repatriated 
prisoners . 'le get echoes of an uprising in Tibet or Yunnan. 
The picture is far from complete. What we do know, however, the 
r eports we have, tell of mass executions, mob trials, sporadic revolts, and 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 38, Folder 31, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 4 -
monstrous oppression. They tell of an incessant and intense activity in e very 
realm of life. They tell of a new China fed on a mixed diet of militant nationalism, 
pro-Sovietism and seething hatred of America. They also tell o f a rising power, 
an expanding industrial po wer, a ruthless political power and a military power 
unequalled in modern Chinese his tory. 
Mr. President, if we do not comprehend fully what transpires within 
Communist China, we can nevertheless observe the impact that this new Asian 
force has already made outside its border s. The Peking regime has been r e cog-
nized by about 25 nations. It has a mounting international influence, particularly 
in Asia, as was clearly indicated at the Bandung Conference last year. It is 
exerting an increasing control over huge Chinese communities in such Southeast 
Asian cities as Bangkok, Singapore, and Djakarta. It has an expanding trade, 
particularly with the countries to the south, a trade which was initiated with 
barters of raw material s and food but which is now spreading to include a flood of 
low- priced consumer goods of Chinese manufacture . 
In the military realm, the nature of the Peking regime is already too 
evident. We have seen how, with the support of the Soviet Union, this new power 
rapidly enveloped the China mainland, how it rolled into position for an invasion 
of Formosa, how it spilled over into Korea and how it made its presence felt in 
Northern Indochina. 
Not only in militar y matters, but in other ways, Peking has aligned 
its policies with those of the Soviet Union. The latter has supplied the Chinese 
Communists with ideological guidance , diplomatic assistance. and other aid. 
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Most of all, the Soviet Union has provided the implements of war and destruction. 
The Chinese people have paid dearly for this assistance. They have paid for it 
with the products of their land, with the sweat of their labor and even with their 
lives. 
Whether the present upheavals in the Soviet Union will have a 
significant influence on the Moscow -Peking alignment remains to be seen. 
Certainly, recent developments in Europe suggest that possibility. What the 
repercussions may be in China, however , is another matter. Those with the 
penchant will find in this question a wide field for speculation. At this point it 
would be well, in my opinion, to acknowledge frankly that we do not know . 
Speculation, however interesting it may be, ought not to divert us 
from the immediate realities which confront American policy in the Far East. As 
I have al ready noted, the most formidable of these realities is the existence of a 
powerful and hostile regime in Peking. We are still faced with the hostility of 
that regime, regardless of what inner changes may be taking place in world com -
munism . This hostility confronts us most directly in the Korean and Formosan 
situations. 
In both, the pea.ce of the Far East and perhaps of the world still hangs 
in dangerous balance. 
I<orea remains divided today at the 38th Parallel as it was in 1945, 
and there are no signs of a permanent peace in that country . It is true that an 
armistice concluded in 1953 stilled the gu.ns along this dividing line between the 
Communist world and the free nations. How long will this tenuous truce, this 
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uncertain truce, contin,\e to hold? The Communists in Ncrth Korea have circum-
vented the terms of the cease-fire. The truce was supposed to freeze the mili-
tary situation. But the Communists have gone on augmenting their military 
forces, particularly their air strength, A Neutral }\lations Commission charged 
with supervising the armistice to prevent violations has been crippled by the non-
neutrality of the Polish and Czech members. It has now been forced to terminate 
its activities. The desire of the Koreans for unification -- and it is an under-
standable desire --was exhausted by the recent bloodletting. Now it is rising 
again, rising to a level of impatience. 
In these circ:u.nslances how can anyone talk glibly of peace in Korea? 
Any incident along the 3ath Parallel could touch off a renewal of the conflict. If 
full-scale hostilities are resumed, this country will not avoid their impact . We 
are deeply committed by word and action to the preservation of a free republic of 
Korea and two diviaions o.i our armed forces remain in l{orea to sustain that 
commitment. 
In Formosa, a situation of comparable danger exists. 
It is time to set the record straight with respect to that situation. We 
have had more words th<m wisdom in this matter, more press agentry than 
policy-making. It is no wonder that the American people and others are confused 
as to our purposes and policies. 
Let us get one point straight once and for all. This country has 
never had any desire to possess the island cf Formosa. The Communist propa-
gandists who have made these charges know that they are wholly false. They 
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know that had such been our intention we were in a military position at the end 
of ''lorld War II to realize it. It was not our intention then; it is not our intention 
now. 
This country does, however, have legitimate interests in the fate of 
Formosa, interests by right of the sacrifices we made in World War II and by 
right of the sacrifices made in carrying out a United Nations decision to stop 
aggression in Korea. We have the right to expect that the status of that island is 
net such as to establish a springboard for eventual aggression against other free 
nations and ourselves in the future. We have a right and an obligation, a long with 
other nations, to see to it that the people on the island - - people who were once 
ruled by a Japan which was defeated by us -- to see to it that they are not as a 
consequence of that defeat subjected to a blood bath through no cause of thei1· own. 
How were we to safeguard these interests and discharge these 
responsibilities in the light of events on the Chinese mainland after World War II ? 
From 19~9 on, Formosa became a target of invasion of the Chinese Communists 
and a refuge of the Government of Chiang Kai-ahek. Were we to permit th at 
invasion especially at a tune when we and others were faced with an aggression 
in Korea? 
Since 1949, moreover, the people of Formosa have depended heavily 
on the policies of this cout~try for their safety and well-being. American assist-
ance has made possible a great improvement in their living conditions . It has 
trained, equipped, and sustained armed forces fer their security . American 
military pcwer has served to forestal\ an invasion of the island and to prevent 
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the widespread cteath a"'lc.! 'lc:;va~ta~il)r among the Formosan people which would 
have a~co•npanied st:ch an in,asion. 
At t:t! u.ltl; ·eak of the I<orean conflict in 1950, an .Executive Ord~1 
interposed the St::v~"'d' F 1 ~et in thE' Formosan Straits to i!'lhibit a spread of the 
r-<orean aggress10~ to ether <::.~eas h the Far .East. The action served its purpose. 
A measure of tranquillity settled over the Formosan at·ea. For three years there 
were no attempted invasion!l. Then in l<l53 this situation was suddenly altered by 
new Executive Orders and bombast We have seen the result. The threat of 
Communist invasion onN :..fiain inter.s ified . .Sy 1955 it had :.-eached such a point 
that the Executive l3:.:ar ch ilO longPr felt able to handle the matter alone. The 
President found it nec;e·::::~a:-y to qeek Congressional support for desperate ' 
. .. : 
measures to save F::>rmosa. Vh are now back whel'e we were in 1950, except 
more deeply and inextric.:ab ~' enn'eshed than ever bt~~ore in a situation which 
hovers on the brink o~ w~.r. 
T~ reverr:al. o£ roti .. v in ~953 would h<'.'Jt• been •mderstandable if this 
Administration, unlike it::J pr-edec.,as~r, was not be"\v on ?reventing an extension 
of the war in the Far East beyond t<orea. As fa.r as ! can ~ee, however, this 
Administration has desn·{'d ';~ p-revent ~.-l-c :1. a,., e·.cte~.sion. Oth<:rwise, it would 
not have negotiated a truce in Kot-ea, Otherwise, it would have supported 
Chiang t<ai-shek's aspirations to liberate the mainlanci which it has not done. 
Otherwise, it would ha·.,.e ~:-·de:'"ed a bombbg beyond the Yalu which it has not 
done. Otherwi!le, it would net b::! negotiating with the Chinese Communists in 
Geneva as it has been doi.1g for tJ-.e pasl year. 
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It seems to me that the policy which this Administration is following 
with respect to Communist China does not differ in principle with that of its 
predecessor. The words may be different. The pos lures may be different. 
The substance is the s<\me. Our present course is a policy that is neither 
peace nor war but a polic) ?f the in-between . It differs in one respect from 
the previous policy. It gambles more recklessly with the risk of full - scale war 
in the Far East. 
We may either applaud o r deplo re this state of affairs. The one 
thing we cannot do is tc cl 'Se our eyes to its actuality. Nor can we ignore the 
fact that history suggests that relations among nations in a state of hostility 
do not remain suspended indefinitely on a razor's edge . Sooner or tater, they 
veer towards one or the other, towards greater conflict or towards closer 
relations. 
I do not know what will emerge -eventually from this anomalous 
situation with respect to Co1nmuuist China. As I have already noted, the 
po licies and attitudes of this government as well as those of Peking will pro -
foundly influence the outcom.c , So, too, will circumstances around the rim of 
the A s ian mainland. 
In our policies we have counted heavily on the clos e re l ations 
which we have maintained with Japan and the Philippines since the end of 
World War II. We have co~otnted on these two nations and others to work with 
us for the preservation of peace, {c r mutual defense against aggres sian in that 
region. 
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These relations with the free nations of the Far East cannot be 
expected to flourish of their own accord. They require a constant toning which 
can be supplied only by perceptive and creative foreign policies, We have seen 
in the last few weeks how the lack of such policies can give rise to serious 
strains in a relationship a.s close even as that of the United States and the 
Philippines. The clumsy handling of the question of sovereignty over American 
military bases in that country threatened to undermine in a moment years of 
constructive effort and the provision of extensive assistance. Fortunately, the 
Executive Branch has acted, however belatedly, to correct this ineptitude. 
If strains can develop so quickly in relations with the Philippines, 
how much more likely are they to appear in our ties with other Asian countries, 
ties which are of more recent date and as yet largely untried. 
The fact is, Mr. President, that strains have appeared elsewhere. 
They have appeared most s~nificantly with respect to Japan. The Japanese have 
not yet developed their own defense forces. There is nevertheless a growing 
resentment in Japan a.gainst contiuued dependency on the United States for defense. 
The Japanese are also beginning to press for a roe turn of the Bonins and Okinawa. 
These strategic islands are presently held by this country but their ultimate 
status was left uncertain in the Japanese treaty. The Japanese show signs, too, 
of a gathering impatience with restrictions on their trade with Communist China. 
They are maintaining these restrictions in accord with the United Nations 
embargo but they have seen other nations ignore or circumvent them. 
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V/hile Japanese-American relations are undergoing strains, Japan 
is preparing to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union looking to a trea ty of 
peace and the restoration of diplomatic relations. There were such negotiations 
in the past but they ran into the hard wall of Soviet intr ansigeance . As is evident 
elsewhere in the world, however, Soviet policies are shifting rapidly and there 
is no r eason to assume that they will not change with respect to Japan . 
If the Soviet Union means to have diplomatic re lations with the 
Japanese, they have much to offer. There are islands to the north of J apan 
which may be returned . There are valuable fishing concessions in the waters of£ 
Soviet Asia. There are in"portant trade and economic concessions. There is 
membership in the United Nations long sought by Japan and long deni ed by the 
Soviet veto. There are, finally, Japanese prisoners of ··Vor l d War II still he ld 
in Soviet Siberia to be returned. 
Mr . President, I belleve this country would be well - advised to expect 
the restoration of Soviet-Japanese relations in the near future. It is coming and 
it is probably coming soon. So, too, is the likelihood of a sharp expansion of 
Japanese trade with the Asian mainland. 
These developments are to be anticipated in a Japan which must 
literally fish and trade on a vast scale to survive in peace. The J apanese are 
compelled to search where they can for opportunities to do both. They can find, 
they have found, many opportunities for trade with free nations . Increasingl y, 
however, their efforts in that direction begin to run into the political reality of 
the adjustments which free nations have to make in their own economies if they 
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ar.! to acc ~ .-r.r:"lcdatc Japanese trade. T~ put the problem bluntly, how far are 
the free nations prepared to go in admitting imports from Japan? 
V!e had better face the fact that the Communist nations of Asia arc 
in a position to offer significant opportunities to Japan for trade and fishing as 
well as other economic concessions. If they make such offers sufficiently 
attractive, as sooner or later they may be expected to do, the Japanese are going 
to tal<e them. 
The development of increasing Japanese economic contact with the 
Asian mainland need net in itself constitute a cause for alarm. The danger lies 
in the possible political repercussion of this development. It seems to me that 
adverse consequences in this respect can be held in check by intelligent policies 
on the part of this country, Japan, and other free nations. 
I am not suggesting a competition of concessione with the Soviet bloc 
to hold Japan to our side. A Japan which could be kept in that fashion is nol worth 
the keeping. What I~ suggesting, however, is that we recognize that the 
present alignment of Japan with the free nations requires more than pious state-
ments for its preservation. It requires action., mutually beneficial action, in the 
economic realm, in the cultural realm and in matters of military defense. 
If there is an absence of intelligent policy directed to this end, we 
shall live to see the ugly consequences of the failure. VTe shall live to see a 
Japan in headlong flight into t'1e Communist orbit or embarked once again on 
some form of militarist totalitarianism of its own. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 38, Folder 31, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- n -
I do not mean to suggest, Mr. President, that these dangers are 
imminent. They are there, nevertheless , in the background. They do not 
provide any greater cause for complacency over the safety and welfare of this 
country than does the ambivalent situation with respect to Communist China. 
Nor are present circumstances much more reassuring elsewhere in 
the East. I have already covered the situation in Southeast Asia in a previous 
statement in this series and I shall not take the time of the Senate to go over the 
same ground toc.lay. 
I should lil<e to emphasize, however, that American relationships 
throughcut that area e-n· it• serious need o£ repair, goodwill tours of the Vice 
President which I highly approve of in principle -- notwithstanding. 
'fie had one more evidence of neglect cf these relations just a few 
days ago. The former King of Cambodia, in Moscow, linked his country 's 
future closely with that of Russia . We have no one to blame for this turn of 
events except ourselves. It was apparent last year that despite the vast efforts 
which this country was making to help the Cambodian nation through the first 
years of independence, our relations with that country were deteriorating . 
In my report on Cambodia to the Foreign Relations Committee last 
October I noted: 
The /United States 7 aid programs, if properly 
administered can oe hei{>ful . . . and of lasting benefit 
to beth countries. It seems to me essential, however, 
to emphasize that unless great caution and restraint 
is exercised in administering American assistance it 
will produce not only an inexcusable waste of American 
funds but serious dis locations in Cambodia. Aid can 
act to the benefit of our relations with that country but 
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it can also act to their detriment; it depends on how 
the program is handled. . . . I recommend that the 
Executive branch review carefully the extent of all 
our activity in Cambodia. It has grown rapidly in 
the past year, as has the number of official 
Americans in Cambodia, and size in either case 
is not the measure of what best serves this nation 'e 
interest. 
Was such a 1eview, a full scale r eview of our activities in Cambod1a 
ever undertaken? Not to my knowledge, Mr. President. Instead, a situation 
obvious ly bad months ago was allowed to go on deteriorating while millions of 
dollars and numerous officials were poured into Cambodia. We see the conse-
quences. Now there will undoubtedly be a review ·- but the damage has already 
been done. 
It should be dear, Mr. President, from the quotaticns I have just 
read that when 1 suggest that our relations with Southeast Asia are in need of 
repair, I am not suggesting bigger aid programs. I ~ suggesting, as I have 
suggested many times, and as the Committee on Foreign Relations will now under-
take, a full-scale reappraisal of the existing aid programs, I~ suggesting les a 
pique and more perception in dealing with the Asian countries. I~ suggesting a 
better coordination of the statements and activities of the Executive Branch 
affecting those countries. I~ suggesting that we wake up to the fact that 
Communist penetration of this region -- commercial, diplomatic and ideological 
--is deep and it is increasing and that its success is due in no small part to the 
ineffectiveness of our policies and the way they are being administered. 
Mr. President, I noted at the outset the difficulties in holding to an 
effective course in the Far East. It seems to me high time, however, that this 
government faces up to the difficultles. 
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The foreign policy of this nation for the Far East or any region cannot 
be based on glib catchwords and slick phrases. If it is to serve our interests, 
that policy must grow out of a comprehension of our national interests in the 
Far East. These interests, as I understand them, lie in a peace which 
satisfies the reasonable needs of security o f this country against aggression. 
They lie in a flourishing commerce and in scientific, c ultural and religious ties 
which can enrich our lives. 
None of these interests can be pursued in a vacuum , in isolation. We 
cannot have the security of peace in the Far East, alone . We obviously cannot 
have commerce there, alone. And obvio usly, we cannot have scientific, cultural 
and religious ties, alone. 
We can, in short, pursue our interests in the Far East only in concert 
with ethers . We can do so only i£ there is a reciprocal desire for intercourse 
on the part of others and a willingness to adjust the attitude and policies of all to 
make this intercourse possible . 
That is not presently the case with China. We have had only a con -
tinuous hostility emanating from that source ever since the Pe'dng regime came 
to power and we have replied inevitably in kind. The Chinese Communists have 
bullied and browbeaten, They have inflicted thousands of unnecessary casualties 
on the forces of this country and others by their intervention in T<:orea. They 
have ec,.., urged and villified the good name of the United States . They have turned 
the sentiments of the Chinese people against us, sentiments built on a century o r 
more of f r iendly contact. 
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I do not eay that the attitude of Cbina towards the United States will 
never change. Those of us who have lived through World ';{ar II and the fan tastic 
changes of the past few years should know by now that there are few 11nevers 11 in 
the r e lations among nations. 
I do say, howeve r, tangible evidence of change in China does not no w 
exist. I do say that unless the !<oreans have an opportunity to achieve their unity 
and independence in peace, such evidence does not exist. I do say that unless it 
is clear that the status of F o rmosa can be determined without the bloodlettin g 
which a Communist invasion would inflict on the people of that island, there is no 
evidence of change. 
If the Executive Branch does have such evidence growing out of its 
year-long conversations with t he Chinese Communists in Geneva, then the time 
is r apidly approaching when it should so inform the American people. If it does 
not, we may well ask why the se conversations are being c o ntinued , 
I think it is time, too, for the Executive Branch to make clear that 
we do ne t re taliate on the entire Chinese people, the hostility which the Peking 
government direc t s at us. The ties, the deep ties, which once linked the people 
of this country with the people of China -- religious ties, cultural ties, commer-
cial ties -- can survive this period o f separation enforced by the Peking regime. 
They will survive, howeve r, :)nly if the words and actio ns of this gove r nment 
make it clear that we wish the m tc- sur vive. 
I.£ we are estopFed fro m our historical c ontact with the Chinese people 
at this time, we are not prevented from re info rcing o ur relations with the rest c f 
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Asia. In a sense, that is what we have been trying to do . That is the lo gic of 
the defen se tre aties with Japan, the Philippines and other nations . It is the logic 
in the vast aid programs. It is the lo gic of the information program. 
And, lo gically, too , it is time to find out why these policies are not 
working as they shoul d, why, as in Cambodia, they are producing effects opposite 
from which we ho ped they would produce. It is time for the Executive Branch to 
r e a s sess thes e pro grams and the way they are being administered. It is time for 
the Executive Branch to r e view carefully its diplomatic practices and personnel 
in the Far East. It is time for that branch to wake up to the existence of strains 
in our relali.ons with m any nations in that area and to adjust our policies to reduce 
these strains. It is time for new measures which will strengthen the ties between 
ourselves and Asian nations. 
Ten years ago , Mr. President, this country was welcomed with a 
deep and genuine enthusiasm througho ut Asia, from Korea to Australia, from 
the P hilippines to Afghanistan. Year by year the welcome has become more 
strained. Despite vast efforts, the welcome is now a grudging one in some 
countries; in others it is no welcome at all. It is time, Mr. President, to ask 
ourselves why. Even more important, it -i.s time to find out why . 
